The List of Designated Terrorist Organizations Was Released - Rajavi cult failed again in its lobbying efforts (April 2008)
The List of Designated Terrorist Organizations Was Released
Rajavi cult failed again in its lobbying efforts
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... Redesignation of MKO as a terrorist organization underlines the fact that the organization has failed in its lobbying efforts to convince its supporters in the Congress to reconsider its outlaw position. Reportedly, MKO has been engaged in unproductive intelligence collaboration with American forces in Iraq to appease them since they are well aware of the hypocritical nature of MKO especially after was transformed into a cult of personality asserted in the State Department’s report of April 30, 2007...
Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the US State Department play a critical role in fighting against terrorism and is an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business as asserted by the State Department. Through a fact sheet published by Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism on April 8, 2008, the current list of designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) was released. The name of Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK/MKO/PMOI), a terrorist Iranian group also proscribed by some other countries including the country members of EU, occupies the row 29 of the total 44 names as it has been in the list since 1997.
To identify a FTO, as explained in the report, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department (S/CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, S/CT looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.
Redesignation of MKO as a terrorist organization underlines the fact that the organization has failed in its lobbying efforts to convince its supporters in the Congress to reconsider its outlaw position. Reportedly, MKO has been engaged in unproductive intelligence collaboration with American forces in Iraq to appease them since they are well aware of the hypocritical nature of MKO especially after was transformed into a cult of personality asserted in the State Department’s report of April 30, 2007.
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State Department Issues List of Foreign Terrorist Groups
State Department Issues List of Foreign Terrorist Groups
Fact sheet lists current designated foreign terrorist organizations
(begin fact sheet)
United States Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Washington, DC April 8, 2008
Fact Sheet
Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.
Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations
1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 2. Abu Sayyaf Group 3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 4. Al-Shabaab 5. Ansar al-Islam 6. Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 7. Asbat al-Ansar 8. Aum Shinrikyo 9. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) 10. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) 11. Continuity Irish Republican Army 12. Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) 13. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) 14. Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) 15. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) 16. Hizballah (Party of God) 17. Islamic Jihad Group 18. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 19. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed) 20. Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI) 21. al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) 22. Kahane Chai (Kach) 23. Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK) 24. Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous) 25. Lashkar i Jhangvi 26. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 27. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 28. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) 29. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) 30. National Liberation Army (ELN) 31. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) 32. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 33. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF) 34. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC) 35. Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (al-Qaida in Iraq) (formerly Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, JTJ, al-Zarqawi Network) 36. al-Qa’ida 37. al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly GSPC) 38. Real IRA 39. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 40. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA) 41. Revolutionary Organization 17 November 42. Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) 43. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) 44. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
Identification
The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department (S/CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, S/CT looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.
Designation
Once a target is identified, S/CT prepares a detailed "administrative record," which is a compilation of information, typically including both classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the designation, Congress is notified of the Secretary’s intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the designation, as the INA requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period and in the absence of Congressional action to block the designation, notice of the designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes effect. By law an organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.
Until recently the INA provided that FTOs must be redesignated every 2 years or the designation would lapse. Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), however, the redesignation requirement was replaced by certain review and revocation procedures. IRTPA provides that an FTO may file a petition for revocation 2 years after its designation date (or in the case of redesignated FTOs, its most recent redesignation date) or 2 years after the determination date on its most recent petition for revocation. In order to provide a basis for revocation, the petitioning FTO must provide evidence that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation are sufficiently different as to warrant revocation. If no such review has been conducted during a 5 year period with respect to a designation, then the Secretary of State is required to review the designation to determine whether revocation would be appropriate. In addition, the Secretary of State may at any time revoke a designation upon a finding that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation, or that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation. The same procedural requirements apply to revocations made by the Secretary of State as apply to designations. A designation may be revoked by an Act of Congress, or set aside by a Court order.
Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended
1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.
Legal Ramifications of Designation
1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO. (The term "material support or resources" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) as " any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) provides that for these purposes “the term ‘training’ means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) further provides that for these purposes the term ‘expert advice or assistance’ means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.’’
2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)).
3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Other Effects of Designation
1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and to encourage other nations to do the same. 2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally. 3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations. 4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations. 5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations.
(end fact sheet)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
State Department's Report on Mojahedin Khalq Orgainsation, Rajavi cult headed by Massoud Rajavi and Maryam Rajavi
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US, State Department Office, May 2, 2007
The State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism on April 30 released the list of designated terrorist organizations. Once again Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) continues to occupy the status it has been designated since 1997.
As noted before, the new report of "Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism", published on April 30, has a more serous tone on the MKO than previous reports.
These additions, retrieved by comparing annual terrorism report 2006 and 2006, are as follows:
Additions to "Description":
- Pointing to the assassination of US military and civilian personnel in Iran during 1970s,
- Stressing the ability and the will of MKO members and leadership to conduct terrorist operations across the world,
- Introducing the MKO as one of the most violent political groups, established during 60s,
- Emphasizing the fact that MKO was disliked by Iranians, following the Islamic Revolution,
- Underlining the fact that for more than 3 decades, MKO used its bases in Iraq and Europe to conduct terror attacks against Iran,
- Expansion of financial base, military skills and leaders' activities in Europe.
- Showing cult-like characteristics, in addition to terrorist ones,
- Ideological pressure on members and offering them distorted history of Iran,
- Stressing the existence of compulsory divorces, cleansing sessions and separation of kids from their parents,
- Establishing cult-of-personality around Rajavi.
Additions to "Activities":
- Confessing that despite US efforts, MKO members and leaders have never been taken to court for their role in illegal activities,
- MKO has been supported by reprehensible regimes, like that of Saddam Hussein.
- Stressing that MKO conducted terrorist operations from its bases in France for 5 years,
- Citing reports that showed Maryam Rajavi encouraged members to "crush Kurds under the tanks",
- That 7 Iranians had been arrested by FBI for transferring 400000 dollars to the MKO for buying weapons,
- Voluntarily surrender to coalition, after the ouster of Saddam, and submitting heavy weaponries,
- Arrest of 160 MKO members, including Maryam Rajavi, in France for using its bases in France for planning and financing terrorist operations,
- Self-immolations by MKO members, following the detention of Maryam Rajavi,
- Maryam Rajavi's going to hiding, and using video-satellite to motivate members,
- Discovering documents that prove MKO received the money of oil-for-food program and used the money for terrorist attacks,
- Citing documents that prove MKO-Saddam ties: lists, a film showing Saddam when he gives a suitcase of money to MKO's known leaders, and a footage of MKO members being trained by Iraqi army.
Additions to "Strength":
- Settlement of MKO supporters and members across Europe,
- Stressing the fact that "protected status" (4th Geneva Convention) doesn't apply to MKO members outside Camp Ashraf or to the group as a foreign terrorist organization,
- The fact that several MKO members, trained by former Iraqi regime to make bomb and work with weapons, are still at large.
Additions to "Location/Area of Operation":
- Maintaining bases in Paris,
- Targeting Iranian elements across the world,
- Active propaganda and lobby of NCRI in the West,
- NCRI's developed media strategies
Additions to "External Aid":
More reliance, after the fall of Saddam, on financial aids, collected under the name of unreal groups.
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Mojahedin remains on US terror list
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US, State Department Office, May 2, 2007
The State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism on April 30 released the list of designated terrorist organizations. Once again Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) continues to occupy the status it has been designated since 1997.
MEK is also active under a variety of other pseudonyms known as MKO; Mujahedin-e Khalq; Muslim Iranian Students' Society; National Council of Resistance; National Council of Resistance (NCR); Organization of the People's Holy Warriors of Iran; The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA); The People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI); National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran.
Although the designation is not new, but a reference to its activities contributes to the EU decisiveness to keep it on its terror list. One of the reasons contradicting MEK’s claim of renouncing terrorist activities since June 2001 is well defined by the State Department’s explanation of the group’s activities:
"In 2003, French authorities arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks. Upon the arrest of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi, MEK members took to Paris' streets and engaged in self-immolation. French authorities eventually released Rajavi." [Rajavi was released on bail and is currently awaiting trial on terrorism charges.]
. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) a.k.a. MKO; Mujahedin-e Khalq; Muslim Iranian Students' Society; National Council of Resistance; National Council of Resistance (NCR); Organization of the People's Holy Warriors of Iran; The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA); The People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI); National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran
Description The MEK advocates the violent overthrow of the Iranian regime and was responsible for the assassination of several U.S. military personnel and civilians in the 1970's. MEK leadership and members across the world maintain the capacity and will to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United State, Canada, and beyond.
The MEK emerged in the 1960s as one of the more violent political movements opposed to the Pahlavi dynasty and its close relationship with the United States. MEK ideology has gone through several iterations and blends elements of Marxism, Islam, and feminism. Following its participation in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the group rapidly fell out of favor with the Iranian people. The new Iranian government under Supreme Leader Khomeini systematically arrested and targeted many MEK members, causing most MEK leadership to flee to Europe. In 1986, MEK leaders and operatives were evicted from France and provided a safe haven in Iraq by Saddam Hussein. The group has planned and executed terrorist operations against the Iranian regime for nearly three decades from its European and Iraqi bases of operations. Additionally, it has expanded its fundraising base, further developed its paramilitary skills, and aggressively worked to expand its European ranks. In addition to its terrorist credentials, the MEK has also displayed cult-like characteristics. Upon entry into the group, new members are indoctrinated in MEK ideology and revisionist Iranian history. Members are also required to undertake a vow of "eternal divorce" and participate in weekly "ideological cleansings." Additionally, children are reportedly separated from parents at a young age. MEK leader Maryam Rajavi has established a "cult of personality." She claims to emulate the Prophet Muhammad and is viewed by members as the "Iranian President in exile."
Activities The group's worldwide campaign against the Iranian government uses propaganda and terrorism to achieve its objectives and has been supported by reprehensible regimes, including that of Saddam Hussein. During the 1970s, the MEK assassinated several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the violent takeover in 1979 of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Despite U.S. efforts, MEK members have never been brought to justice for the group's role in these illegal acts.
In 1981, MEK leadership attempted to overthrow the newly installed Islamic regime; Iranian security forces subsequently initiated a crackdown on the group. The MEK instigated a bombing campaign, including an attack against the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Prime Minister's office, which killed some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. These attacks resulted in a popular uprising against the MEK and an expanded Iranian government crackdown which forced MEK leaders to flee to France. For five years, the MEK continued to wage its terrorist campaign from its Paris headquarters. Expelled by France in 1986, MEK leaders turned to Saddam Hussein's regime for basing, financial support, and training. Near the end of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad armed the MEK with heavy military equipment and deployed thousands of MEK fighters in suicidal, mass wave attacks against Iranian forces.
The MEK's relationship with the former Iraqi regime continued through the 1990s. In 1991, the group reportedly assisted in the Iraqi Republican Guard's bloody crackdown on Iraqi Shia and Kurds who rose up against Saddam Hussein's regime; press reports cite MEK leader Maryam Rajavi encouraging MEK members to "take the Kurds under your tanks." In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group's ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key Iranian military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, Brigadier General Ali Sayyaad Shirazi.
In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran's interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during "Operation Great Bahman" in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One of those attacks included a mortar attack against a major Iranian leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved in regular mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids against Iranian military and law enforcement personnel, as well as government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border. Also in 2001, the FBI arrested seven Iranians in the United States who funneled $400,000 to an MEK-affiliated organization in the UAE which used the funds to purchase weapons. Following an initial Coalition bombardment of the MEK's facilities in Iraq at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK leadership negotiated a cease-fire with Coalition Forces and voluntarily surrendered their heavy-arms to Coalition control. Since 2003, roughly 3,400 MEK members have been encamped at Ashraf in Iraq, under the supervision of Coalition Forces.
In 2003, French authorities arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks. Upon the arrest of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi, MEK members took to Paris' streets and engaged in self-immolation. French authorities eventually released Rajavi. Although currently in hiding, Rajavi has made appearances via video-satellite to "motivate" MEK-sponsored conferences across the globe.
According to evidence which became available after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK received millions of dollars in Oil-for-Food program subsidies from Saddam Hussein from 1999 through 2003, which supported planning and executing future terrorist attacks. In addition to discovering 13 lists of recipients of such vouchers on which the MEK appeared, evidence linking the MEK to the former Iraqi regime includes lists, as well as video footage of Saddam Hussein handing over suitcases of money to known MEK leaders, and video of MEK operatives receiving training from the Iraqi military.
Strength Estimates place MEK's worldwide membership in the several thousands, with large pockets in Paris and other major European capitals. In Iraq, roughly 3,400 MEK members are gathered under Coalition supervision at Camp Ashraf, the MEK's main compound north of Baghdad, where they have been designated as "protected persons" under Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This status does not affect the group's members outside of Camp Ashraf or the MEK's designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. As a condition of the 2003 cease-fire agreement, the MEK relinquished more than 2,000 tanks; armored personnel carriers; and heavy artillery. A significant number of MEK personnel have voluntarily left Ashraf, and an additional several hundred MEK defectors have been voluntarily repatriated to Iran. Many MEK leaders and operatives, however, remain at large, and the number of at-large MEK operatives who received weapons and bomb-making instruction from Saddam Hussein's regime remains a source of significant concern.
Location/Area of Operation In the 1980s, the MEK's leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. Following France's recognition of the Iranian regime in 1986, the group's leadership was forced out of France and took up residence in Iraq. The MEK maintains its main headquarters in Paris and has concentrations of members across Europe, in addition to the large concentration of MEK located at Camp Ashraf in Iraq. The MEK's global support structure remains in place with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North America. Operations target Iranian regime elements across the globe, including in Europe and Iran. MEK's political arm, the NCRI, has a global support network with active lobbying and propaganda efforts in major Western capitals. NCRI also has a well-developed media communications strategy.
External Aid Before Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003; the MEK received all of its military assistance and most of its financial support from Saddam Hussein. The fall of Saddam's regime has led MEK to increasingly rely on front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.
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According to the US policy in "war on terror", it has released an annual report on FTOs (Foreign Terrorist Organizations) since 1995.
The above –mentioned was a part of the 2007 report published on April 30th, 2007.
Below you can consider the stand of US towards terrorist Organizations including MKO (Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization) and its front Organizations during 10 past years:
In 1994 DOS released a completely documented report on MKO's activities and background; a part of which you can view here:
US State Department Report in 1994
(Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.
The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, by Kenneth Katzman. Washington, Nov 1992. 6 p.
Doc. call no.: M-U 42953-1 no.92-824F)
Announcement of US about Mojahedin
United States Department of State Washington,
D.C 20520
UNCLASSIFIED
DECL: OADR
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In accordance with section 523 of the FY 1994-95 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Public Law No. 103-236, I am pleased to submit on behalf of the secretary of state the report, "people's Mojahedin of Iran." The Administration has welcomed the opportunity to conduct a comprehensive review of the people's Mojahedin of Iran. The U.S, Government has been monitoring the group's activities since the 1970s. We believe the report to be a balanced and comprehensive analysis.
Consideration of this issue suggests it may be appropriate to take this opportunity to restate the Administration's policy towards the government of Iran. We want to be clear that our conclusions about the Mojahedin do not in any way imply support for the behavior of the current regime in Iran. As you are aware, longstanding U.S policy on Iran has been based on an unvarying premise: Iran should not enjoy the benefits of normal, state-to-state relation with other countries so long as it acts in ways that fall outside generally understood patterns of acceptable government behavior.
The Honorable Lee H. Hammilton, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.
UNCLASSIFIED
Our record of objection to outlaw Iranian behavior is clear. We vigorously oppose Iran's support for terrorism, its efforts to block the Middle East peace process through violence, its attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and its dismal human rights record. Until Iran alters its behavior in these critical areas, we will continue to lead the world in pressuring Tehran. We must convince the regime that there is a price to be paid for flouting international standards.We welcome the opportunity to brief the Congress on all aspects of our bilateral relations with Iran. You can be assured we will continue to monitor the activities of the Mojahedin. We remain, however, guided by the premise that our mutual distaste for the behavior of the regime in Tehran should not influence our analysis of the Mojahedin.
Sincerely,
Wendy R. Shermen Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs
Enclosure:
Report on the People's Mojahedin of Iran
UNCLASSIFIED
PEOPLE'S MOJAHEDIN OF IRAN
UNCLASSIFIED DECL: OADK
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
HISTORY
CURRENT ACTIVITIES
STRUCTURE
EXTERNAL SUPPORT
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full report:
US State Department’s stand on Rajavi’s cult 1994 to 2007
Three Criteria for Designation
1. The organization must be foreign.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity as defined in Section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (See attachment for text.(
3. The organization's activities must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.
US State Department Terrorism Report 2007
Chapter 6 -- Terrorist Organizations
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) aliases cited are consistent with and drawn from the Specially Designated Nationals list maintained by the Department of Treasury. The full list can be found at the following website: http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/sdnlist.txt
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
April 30, 2007
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG(
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Ansar al-Sunna (AS(
Armed Islamic Group (GIA (
Asbat al-Ansar
Aum Shinrikyo (Aum(
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA(
Communist Party of Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA(
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA(
Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG(
HAMAS
Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM(
Hizballah
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU(
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU(
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM(
Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI(
Al-Jihad (AJ(
Kahane Chai (Kach(
Kongra-Gel (KGK/PKK(
Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT(
Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ(
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE(
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG(
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM(
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK(
National Liberation Army (ELN(
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF(
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ(
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP(
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC (
Al-Qaida (AQ(
Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI(
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) [Formerly Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC(]
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK( a.k.a. MKO; Mujahedin-e Khalq; Muslim Iranian Students' Society; National Council of Resistance; National Council of Resistance (NCR); Organization of the People's Holy Warriors of Iran; The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA); The People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI); National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran
Description The MEK advocates the violent overthrow of the Iranian regime and was responsible for the assassination of several U.S. military personnel and civilians in the 1970's. MEK leadership and members across the world maintain the capacity and will to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United State, Canada, and beyond.
The MEK emerged in the 1960s as one of the more violent political movements opposed to the Pahlavi dynasty and its close relationship with the United States. MEK ideology has gone through several iterations and blends elements of Marxism, Islam, and feminism. Following its participation in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the group rapidly fell out of favor with the Iranian people. The new Iranian government under Supreme Leader Khomeini systematically arrested and targeted many MEK members, causing most MEK leadership to flee to Europe. In 1986, MEK leaders and operatives were evicted from France and provided a safe haven in Iraq by Saddam Hussein. The group has planned and executed terrorist operations against the Iranian regime for nearly three decades from its European and Iraqi bases of operations. Additionally, it has expanded its fundraising base, further developed its paramilitary skills, and aggressively worked to expand its European ranks. In addition to its terrorist credentials, the MEK has also displayed cult-like characteristics. Upon entry into the group, new members are indoctrinated in MEK ideology and revisionist Iranian history. Members are also required to undertake a vow of "eternal divorce" and participate in weekly "ideological cleansings." Additionally, children are reportedly separated from parents at a young age. MEK leader Maryam Rajavi has established a "cult of personality." She claims to emulate the Prophet Muhammad and is viewed by members as the "Iranian President in exile."
Activities The group's worldwide campaign against the Iranian government uses propaganda and terrorism to achieve its objectives and has been supported by reprehensible regimes, including that of Saddam Hussein. During the 1970s, the MEK assassinated several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the violent takeover in 1979 of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Despite U.S. efforts, MEK members have never been brought to justice for the group's role in these illegal acts.
In 1981, MEK leadership attempted to overthrow the newly installed Islamic regime; Iranian security forces subsequently initiated a crackdown on the group. The MEK instigated a bombing campaign, including an attack against the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Prime Minister's office, which killed some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. These attacks resulted in a popular uprising against the MEK and an expanded Iranian government crackdown which forced MEK leaders to flee to France. For five years, the MEK continued to wage its terrorist campaign from its Paris headquarters. Expelled by France in 1986, MEK leaders turned to Saddam Hussein's regime for basing, financial support, and training. Near the end of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad armed the MEK with heavy military equipment and deployed thousands of MEK fighters in suicidal, mass wave attacks against Iranian forces.
The MEK's relationship with the former Iraqi regime continued through the 1990s. In 1991, the group reportedly assisted in the Iraqi Republican Guard's bloody crackdown on Iraqi Shia and Kurds who rose up against Saddam Hussein's regime; press reports cite MEK leader Maryam Rajavi encouraging MEK members to "take the Kurds under your tanks." In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group's ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key Iranian military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, Brigadier General Ali Sayyaad Shirazi.
In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran's interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during "Operation Great Bahman" in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One of those attacks included a mortar attack against a major Iranian leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved in regular mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids against Iranian military and law enforcement personnel, as well as government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border. Also in 2001, the FBI arrested seven Iranians in the United States who funneled $400,000 to an MEK-affiliated organization in the UAE which used the funds to purchase weapons. Following an initial Coalition bombardment of the MEK's facilities in Iraq at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK leadership negotiated a cease-fire with Coalition Forces and voluntarily surrendered their heavy-arms to Coalition control. Since 2003, roughly 3,400 MEK members have been encamped at Ashraf in Iraq, under the supervision of Coalition Forces.
In 2003, French authorities arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks. Upon the arrest of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi, MEK members took to Paris' streets and engaged in self-immolation. French authorities eventually released Rajavi. Although currently in hiding, Rajavi has made appearances via video-satellite to "motivate" MEK-sponsored conferences across the globe.
According to evidence which became available after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK received millions of dollars in Oil-for-Food program subsidies from Saddam Hussein from 1999 through 2003, which supported planning and executing future terrorist attacks. In addition to discovering 13 lists of recipients of such vouchers on which the MEK appeared, evidence linking the MEK to the former Iraqi regime includes lists, as well as video footage of Saddam Hussein handing over suitcases of money to known MEK leaders, and video of MEK operatives receiving training from the Iraqi military.
Strength Estimates place MEK's worldwide membership in the several thousands, with large pockets in Paris and other major European capitals. In Iraq, roughly 3,400 MEK members are gathered under Coalition supervision at Camp Ashraf, the MEK's main compound north of Baghdad, where they have been designated as "protected persons" under Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This status does not affect the group's members outside of Camp Ashraf or the MEK's designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. As a condition of the 2003 cease-fire agreement, the MEK relinquished more than 2,000 tanks; armored personnel carriers; and heavy artillery. A significant number of MEK personnel have voluntarily left Ashraf, and an additional several hundred MEK defectors have been voluntarily repatriated to Iran. Many MEK leaders and operatives, however, remain at large, and the number of at-large MEK operatives who received weapons and bomb-making instruction from Saddam Hussein's regime remains a source of significant concern.
Location/Area of Operation In the 1980s, the MEK's leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. Following France's recognition of the Iranian regime in 1986, the group's leadership was forced out of France and took up residence in Iraq. The MEK maintains its main headquarters in Paris and has concentrations of members across Europe, in addition to the large concentration of MEK located at Camp Ashraf in Iraq. The MEK's global support structure remains in place with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North America. Operations target Iranian regime elements across the globe, including in Europe and Iran. MEK's political arm, the NCRI, has a global support network with active lobbying and propaganda efforts in major Western capitals. NCRI also has a well-developed media communications strategy.
External Aid Before Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003; the MEK received all of its military assistance and most of its financial support from Saddam Hussein. The fall of Saddam's regime has led MEK to increasingly rely on front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian
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According to the US policy in "war on terror", it has released an annual report on FTOs (Foreign Terrorist Organizations) since 1995. The above –mentioned was a part of the 2007 report published on April 30th, 2007.
Below you can consider the stand of US towards terrorist Organizations including MKO (Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization) and its front Organizations during 10 past years:
In 1994 DOS released a completely documented report on MKO's activities and background; a part of which you can view here:
(To view the complete report of US State Department in 1994 click here)
US State Department Report in 1994
(Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.
The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, by Kenneth Katzman. Washington, Nov 1992. 6 p.
Doc. call no.: M-U 42953-1 no.92-824F)
Announcement of US about Mojahedin United States Department of State Washington,
D.C 20520
UNCLASSIFIED
DECL: OADR
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In accordance with section 523 of the FY 1994-95 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Public Law No. 103-236, I am pleased to submit on behalf of the secretary of state the report, "people's Mojahedin of Iran." The Administration has welcomed the opportunity to conduct a comprehensive review of the people's Mojahedin of Iran. The U.S, Government has been monitoring the group's activities since the 1970s. We believe the report to be a balanced and comprehensive analysis.
Consideration of this issue suggests it may be appropriate to take this opportunity to restate the Administration's policy towards the government of Iran. We want to be clear that our conclusions about the Mojahedin do not in any way imply support for the behavior of the current regime in Iran. As you are aware, longstanding U.S policy on Iran has been based on an unvarying premise: Iran should not enjoy the benefits of normal, state-to-state relation with other countries so long as it acts in ways that fall outside generally understood patterns of acceptable government behavior.
The Honorable Lee H. Hammilton, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.
UNCLASSIFIED
Our record of objection to outlaw Iranian behavior is clear. We vigorously oppose Iran's support for terrorism, its efforts to block the Middle East peace process through violence, its attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and its dismal human rights record. Until Iran alters its behavior in these critical areas, we will continue to lead the world in pressuring Tehran. We must convince the regime that there is a price to be paid for flouting international standards.We welcome the opportunity to brief the Congress on all aspects of our bilateral relations with Iran. You can be assured we will continue to monitor the activities of the Mojahedin. We remain, however, guided by the premise that our mutual distaste for the behavior of the regime in Tehran should not influence our analysis of the Mojahedin.
Sincerely,
Wendy R. Shermen Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs
Enclosure: Report on the People's Mojahedin of Iran
UNCLASSIFIED PEOPLE'S MOJAHEDIN OF IRAN
UNCLASSIFIED DECL: OADK TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY HISTORY CURRENT ACTIVITIES STRUCTURE EXTERNAL SUPPORT
