US State Department claims no popular support for Mojahedin Khaq (MKO, MEK, Rajavi cult) among Iranains
US State Department claims no popular support for Mojahedin Khaq (MKO, MEK, Rajavi cult) among Iranains
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... A U.S. State Department document released in May 2011 under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act says the MEK has no popular support inside Iran and “to the extent Iranians know about this group they are far more likely to oppose it than support it.” It added, “Any U.S. support for MEK would extremely damage its reputation amongst Iranians and would increase anti-American sentiments in Iran.” The State Department cables quoted defectors as describing MEK as a cult that punishes former members. The cables said the MEK leadership ordered the execution of all attempted defectors ...
A U.S. State Department document released in May 2011 under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act says the MEK has no popular support inside Iran and “to the extent Iranians know about this group they are far more likely to oppose it than support it.” It added, “Any U.S. support for MEK would extremely damage its reputation amongst Iranians and would increase anti-American sentiments in Iran.” The State Department cables quoted defectors as describing MEK as a cult that punishes former members. The cables said the MEK leadership ordered the execution of all attempted defectors.
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UNCLASSIFIED
IRANIAN POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE MEK
Summary Showing a unanimity rare among Iranians, anecdotal information gleaned from both ordinary Iranians living inside Iran and abroad and from Iran analysts strongly indicates that the ‘Mujahedin-e Khalq’ (MEK) opposition group has not significant popular support inside Iran. To the extent that Iranian respondents are familiar with the MEK they express severe dislike for this group, primarily due to its alliance with Saddam Hussein during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. All Iranians queried tended to disbelieve the MEK’s expressed allegiance to the ideals of human rights and democracy, with even hardened Iranian oppositionists and persecuted religious minorities such as the Iranian Baha’i saying they would prefer the current Iranian government to an MEK-affiliated one. Many Iranian respondents believe that any indication of USG support for the MEK would seriously harm USG popularity among ordinary Iranians, even among those Iranians who oppose the current Iranian government, would fuel anti-American sentiment, and would likely empower Iranian hardliners. END SUMMARY
******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ****** SUBJECT: IRANIAN POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE MEK
1. (SBU) NOTE: The following cable is based on input from State Department Iran-watchers and consular interviewing officers in the main posts that interact with Iranians on a regular basis, i.e. ANKARA, BAKU, BERLIN, DUBAI AND ISTANBUL. END NOTE.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Showing a unanimity rare among Iranians, anecdotal information gleaned from both ordinary Iranians living inside Iran and abroad and from Iran analysts strongly indicates that the ‘Mujahedin-e Khalq’ (MEK) opposition group has no significant popular support inside Iran. To the extent that Iranian respondents are familiar with the MEK they express severe dislike for the group, primarily due to its alliance with Saddam Hussein during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. All Iranians queried tended to disbelieve the MEK’s expressed allegiance to the ideals of human rights and democracy, with even hardened Iranian oppositionists and persecuted religious minorities such as the Iranian Baha’i saying they would prefer the current Iranian government to an MEK-affiliated one. Many Iranian respondents believe that any indication of USG support for the MEK would seriously harm USG popularity among ordinary Iranians, even among those Iranians who oppose the current Iranian government, would fuel anti-American sentiment, and would likely empower Iranian hardliners. END SUMMARY.
3. (SBU) MEK – BACKGROUND (see Appendix): Originally a 1960s Islamic-Marxist group dedicated to violent overthrow of the Pahlavi regime, the ‘Mujahedin-e Khalq’ (MEK- a.k.a. ‘The People’s Warriors’) was one of the main popular organizations to emerge in the early days of the 1979 Revolution. The increasing ascendancy by clerical elements supporting Ayatollah Khomeini after the revolution let to this group’s gradual elimination from the ruling coalition and its eventual flight from Iran in the early 1980s. Using Iraq as its base, the MEK mounted attacks against Iranian military during the latter stages of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, then after the 1988 Iran-Iraq cease-fire it continued attacks against Iranian leadership until it was forced to stand down its Iraq-based operations as a result of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003. Currently, MEK supporters claim the group has renounced violence as a tool and seeks a secular, democratic Iran, while its detractors claim it is more a cult of personality centred on a leadership unchanged since 1979 than a popular-based political movement. Its membership in its ‘Camp Ashraf’ base in Iraq consists of a few thousand rank-and-file members, mostly either older original ‘first generation’ members from the 1970s or younger Iranians from poorer ethnic minorities such as Iranian Baluch. Since deprived of Iraq government funding since 2003 the MEK has increasingly relied on fundraising in Europe under various front organizations that use popular antipathy towards the Islamic Republic to solicit money. END BACKGROUND.
4. (SBU) In January and February 2011 State Department Iran-watchers and consular offices in the main posts that interact with Iranians on a regular basis (Ankara, Baku, Berlin, Dubai and Istanbul) asked Iranian contacts and visa applicants their opinions on the MEK.
POPULAR FEEDBACK
5. (SBU) In speaking to hundreds of Iranians both in the preceding two months and before, ordinary Iranians were almost uniformly dismissive of the MEK, reacting with either disdain or apathy, their responses strongly indicating a lack of any significant popular support for the MEK among Iranians living in Iran. Among older Iranians this lack of support was largely due to MEK support of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. Among younger Iranians (i.e. most of the population) this lack of support was derived from both the MEK’s ‘treasonous acts’ in supporting Iraq during the war and also from a near–total lack of information due to the absence of any MEK influence inside Iran.
6. (SBU) The following direct quotes reflect what was heard from ordinary Iranians both inside Iran and abroad:
--- “The MEK are detested among the young and old in Iran, although many young Iranians don’t know much about them, and to the extent they do it is in relation to their pro-Iraqi activities during the Iran-Iraq war. Many young Iranians familiar with the MEK’s lack of any support inside Iran wonder why this group is so well-supported abroad and in international organizations.”
--- “They are hated among Iranians, since their hands are stained with the blood of their fellow countrymen.”
--- “I’m an Iranian Bahai (i.e. the most persecuted religious minority in Iran) and I can tell you that even Bahais in Iran would much prefer the current Iranian government to any MEK government.”
--- “We are scared of them because we think they want power. They are like Fidel Castro in Cuba. They will turn Iran into a North Korea or Cuba. It’s not correct to call them a terrorist group THOUGH: THEY JUST WANT POWER. THEY DO NOT HAve the support of the majority of people. They are not democratic just because they appointed a lady as ‘President of Iran’.”
---“They were supported and loved during the Revolution, especially among young people. We loved them. They were beautiful people. But their Marxist-Islamic ideology has passed away. The group’s ideology is far away from the people now.”
---“Aside from their cooperation with Saddam against Iran, their leadership is immoral – Massoud Rajavi has forced himself on many women, with Maryam’s awareness, and in their camp in Iraq they separate children from their parents. I had a distant relative who joined the MEK and once he did so the rest of the family disowned him.”
---“Nobody likes them.”
---“They have no support in Iran.”
---“The group is not popular. People hate them, and they are terrorists. They killed many people.”
---“Once they fought for what they believed in and they had some support but now we don’t really know who they are and what they do.”
---“They are a terrorist organization.”
---“The MEK is a joke.”
---“They are a bunch of #@$*!” [From a young Iranian male]
---“They MEK under the leadership of Massoud Rajavi and President Maryam Rajavi are meaningless in the domestic Iranian political spectrum and totally marginalized. They try however, with great effort, to create the impression that they are the most significant Iranian exiled opposition group.”
ANALYSTS ON MEK
7. (SBU) The above-cited characterization of the MEK by ordinary Iranians was replicated in feedback from political analysts focused on contemporary Iran, all of whom were Iranian by birth. Without exception these analysts said that the MEK lacked any significant popular support inside Iran, with Iranian popular reactions to the MEK varying from rank ignorance (mostly among the young) to extreme aversion (to those more familiar with their history).
8. (SBU) The following direct quotes from prominent analysts of contemporary Iran, all of whom are Iranian by birth, reflect the feedback received:
---“Right after the 1979 revolution the MEK had considerable support in Iran, especially among the youth. Even after the MEK began its campaign of assassination of official figures in June 1981 and the regime responded by executing several thousand of MEK supporters, there was still sympathy. But then MEK leadership left Iran and went first to France and then Iraq, began collaborating with Saddam Hussein’s regime, and acting as its spies. This turned the tide against the MEK, and the Iranian people began despising MEK for its support of Saddam, for its revealing information about Iran, and for still continuing its campaign of assassination while the nation was involved in a long war.
That has not changed, and in fact it has become stronger, since all sorts of horror stories have been told to the public by former MEK members who had become disillusioned with the leadership and wanted to leave Iraq and Camp Ashraf but were tortured and then delivered to Saddams intelligence as Iranian spies. It was also revealed that the MEK had a direct role in putting down the Shiites uprising in southern Iraq and the Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq right after the first Persian Gulf War. The fact that MEK revealed some information about Iran’s nuclear program also angered a lot of people, because they consider it treason. The net result is that, with losing thousands of its members to executions and consistent opposition to the IRIG, the MEK has no significant base of support in Iran. Given that 70 percent of the population is under 35, they do not even know who the MEK are.
Iranians who know about the MEK consider it nothing but a religio-political cult. MEK has the same power structure as does the IRIG; It has a “Supreme Leader”, Massoud Rajavi; a “President”, Maryam Rajavi, and it demands absolute obedience of the leadership. So, as we say in Persian, “as chaale dar biyaam to chaah biyoftim?” (We are getting ourselves out a small ditch in order to fall down in a deep well?)”.
---“The trick used by MEK is to approach the “simple man on the street” or politicians with little expertise on Iran and convince them that they are collecting signatures or money to protest human rights violations in Iran. These signatures are then used by the organization as proof of support for the organization’s broader political agenda. The organization works under a number of PSEUDONYMS. THE RECENT PROTEST MOVEMent in Iran that followed the 2009 elections showed quite clearly that the MEK has no noticeable support inside Iran and is isolated amongst exiled Iranians as well.”
---“Generally speaking I encountered two things concerning the MEK from living in Iran. The older generations’ has a disdain for the MEK because of their belief that MEK contributed mightily to the radicalism and violence of the early years of the revolution and for its siding with Saddam in the Iran-Iraq war. This disdain was not merely based on the fact that the government held MEK responsible for the bombings of the early revolutionary years. In addition, many liberal and/or secular people whom I know still hold MEK responsible for the radical Islamist turn of the revolution that was then manipulated by more established clerics. The younger generation’s views on the MEK are characterized by apathy and lack of basic knowledge about the group, its leadership, and its political positions. I have not found any evidence that MEK has been able to fire the imagination of a single university or high school student in Iran. Believe it or not, the few students who express interest in radical politics, instead of reform, were much more interested in Marxism than MEK”.
---“Outside Iran, a handful of groups and individuals have sought to emerge as centers of opposition. Among these groups is the MEK. It has no political base inside Iran and no genuine support on the Iranian street. The MEK, an organization based in Iraq that enjoyed the Baathist regime’s support, lost any following it may have had in Iran when it fought on Iraq’s behalf during the 1980-1988 war. Widespread Iranian distaste for the MEK has been cemented by its numerous terrorist attacks against innocent Iranian civilians and Iranian government officials. Since Saddam Hussein’s fall, the MEK now depend almost entirely on the goodwill of the United States, which placed it on its list of foreign terrorist organizations and, at most, seems prepared to use it as a source of intelligence and leverage in its dealings with Iran.
The most prominent international human rights organizations-- including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International -- have determined the MEK to be undemocratic, with a cult-like organizational structure and modus operandi that belies its claim to be a vehicle for democratic change.
During my time living and working in Iran, it became quite clear that the MEK is not at all popular among the Iranian people. Of the literally hundreds of people I interviewed and/or spoke with in Iran about the MEK, not one had anything positive to say about it. When Iran’s (2009) post-election turbulence commenced, the MEK quickly sought to join the frenzy of brewing opposition to the current government inside Iran. But by claiming links to this indigenous opposition, the MEK connected their name to genuinely disenfranchised voters, thereby providing the Iranian government with yet another excuse to “discredit” and crackdown on peaceful protesters.
Increased U.S. government support for the MEK will empower Ahmadinejad and other hardliners in Iran, thereby increasing their (Ahmadinejad and the other hardliners) overall domestic support exponentially. Never has the level of cohesion among regime “insiders” been so low (but) supporting the MEK will provide Iranian government insiders with a foreign-based treat that can be exploited to heal fractures within the regime, increase the number of Iranians that rally around the flag, and eliminate indigenous political opposition -- thereby hurting the very people that America seeks to help. Ironically, if the U.S. wants to help Ahmadinejad and the hardliners cement a long-term dictatorship in Iran, support for the Mojahedin is the way to do it. It will significantly reduce any chance of real rapprochement with the Iranian government, and severely curtail indigenous democratic progress in Iran. The Iranian people won’t forgive or forget this -- particularly given the history surrounding U.S. policies toward Mossadegh and the Shah. And this is one of the cardinal sins poisoning U.S. – Iran relations to this day. It is worth noting that increasing American support for the MEK is a step that the Bush administration—even at the height of its openly hostile Iran policy -- wasn’t willing to take. Even they understood that increased support for the MEK will exacerbate all of the challenges and problems that Iran policy currently poses to the USG.”
--- “The MEK is a dead political group in Iran, even if its specter is not anymore haunting the Iranian people. The MEK has no considerable support in the country, either among the elites or among the ordinary people, whether in the capital Tehran or in the PROVINCES. WHILE IRANIANS FOLLOW ON A DAILY BASIS different opposition websites, the MEK website is one of the poorest regarding the amount of its viewers (this fact is easily provable by checking the traffic the website has comparing to others). The truth is the MEK is one of the most hated political groups in Iran. If Iranians would be asked to choose between MEK and IRGC – Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – they would definitely go for the latter. The MEK is mostly known as a terrorist group in Iran; people are afraid of the group’s obsolete ideology, its aggressive and vengeful rhetoric and its authoritarian leadership.
The Iranian regime is aware how notorious the MEK is and takes advantage of this in certain political situations. During the 2009 unrests, the MEK’s support of the Iranian protestors was a gift for the regime, as it led many people hesitate to come anymore to the streets evidently afraid of their paving the path for MEK to take advantage of the situation. Regardless, the government accused the MEK of initiating terrorist attacks and gunning down people in the streets.
Any U.S. support for MEK would extremely damage its reputation amongst Iranians and would increase anti-American sentiments in Iran. People would regard such an act not as animosity towards the regime but towards the nation. They would assume that the U.S. intentions are not to promote freedom and democracy in Iran, but simply to spoil the country. The Iranian regime would definitely take advantage of such a situation, showing it as a proof of its claims of calling Americans as the enemy of the nation.”
---“The MEK are an Islamist-Socialist cult whose membership numbers in the thousands. Their popular support in Iran is negligible. Over a four year period living in and travelling to Iran I never met anyone who expressed any affinity for them. On the contrary they are widely perceived as brainwashed traitors who fought alongside Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S. government should stay as far away from them as possible. Even (former NSC head) general Jones recent interactions with them have spurred concerned rumors among Iranian democracy activists that Washington may be flirting with the MEK.”
9. (SBU) COMMENT: The results of this admittedly unscientific polling of contacts and ordinary Iranians concerning the MEK confirms what those familiar with Iran already assumed to be the case: regardless of whether the USG deems it a terrorist organization, the MEK lacks any significant popular support in Iran, and to the extent Iranians know about this group they are far more likely to oppose it than support it. The pro-human rights and democratic ideals which the MEK now claims to espouse are ones which the USG also emphasizes in our own Iran policy. But one does not need to support the MEK to promote these goals, and indeed it seems to be the case that any increased show of USG support for this group will not help the cause of freedom and democracy in Iran, but will only adversely impact popular perceptions of the USG among ordinary Iranians, and could also strengthen support for Ahmadinejad and other hardliners. END COMMENT
APPENDIX: MEK HISTORY
1965: MEK Founded on Islamic-Marxist ideology by former members of Iran’s nationalist “Freedom Movement of Iran”.
1970s: MEK engaged in ideological work combined with armed struggle against the Pahlavi regime, to include terrorist killings of US military and civilian personnel in Iran.
1975: MEK splits in to two groups, Marxist and Islamist, with the Marxist group changing its name to “Paykar”.
1979: Massoud Rajavi assumes MEK leadership, and MEK becomes one of the main political groups active during the 1979 Islamic Revolution. MEK supports US Embassy takeover in November 1979.
1979-81: Like Iranian nationalists and leftists elements, MEK influence in government slowly eliminated by the clerical elements supporting Ayatollah Khomeini.
Early 1980: As IRIG moves against MEK, MEK elements inside Iran mount massive assassination campaigns against the IRIG leadership, killing approximately 70 high-ranking IRIG officials in one June 1981 bombing, with another MEK bombing two months later killing the IRIG President and Prime Minister. Hundreds of MEK supporters and members either arrested or killed. Massoud Rajavi forced to flee Iran in 1981, and majority of MEK relocates in France.
1981-1986: Using France as base of operations, MEK continues campaign of violence against Iranian government figures.
1986-1988: In 1986 due to improved Iran-France relations MEK relocates headquarters to Iraq, relaying on Iraq for basing, financial support, and training. During Iran-Iraq war its “NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY” UNDER CONTROL OF THE IRAQI MILITary mounts attacks against the Iranian military, causing it to lose massive support among the Iranian people.
1988: Mass execution of MEK prisoners inside Iran by IRIG.
1989-2003: MEK continues assassination attacks against IRIG officials, receiving major financial support from Saddam Hussein, to include:
--1992 (April): MEK conducts near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries.
-- 1999 (April): MEK assassinates key Iranian military officers, to include deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, Brigadier General Ali Sayyaad Shirazi.
-- 2000 (February): MEK launches series of attacks against Iran, to include a mortar attack against a major Iranian leadership complex in Tehran.
--2000-01: MEK conducts regular mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids against Iranian military and law enforcement personnel, as well as government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border.
1991: MEK assists Iraqi Republican Guards in crackdown on anti-Saddam Iraqi Shia and Kurds.
2001: FBI arrested seven Iranians in the United States who funneled $400,000 to an MEK-affiliated organization in the UAE which used the funds to purchase weapons.
2003: At start of Operation Iraqi Freedom MEK leadership negotiated a cease-fire with Coalition Forces and voluntarily surrenders their heavy-arms to Coalition control.
2003: French authorities arrest 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks.
Post -2003: High level MEK leave MEK’s “Camp Ashraf” in Iraq, relocating in various European capitals.
Anne Singleton from Iran-Interlink visits Camp New Iraq (Formerly Ashraf) in wake of violence by loyalists of the Rajavi cult
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... It is thought that up to 200 MEK members loyal to Massoud Rajavi took part in the violence. It is not known how many of the 3400 residents at the camp continue as members of the terrorist group. Singleton visited the camp at the start of a week of meetings with Iraqi officials to demand that the organisational infrastructure of the group be dismantled, and that the leaders are prosecuted under Iraqi and international law. The remaining residents should be enabled to determine their own futures without pressure from the MEK leaders. Their families should be involved to help in this process. Over 1000 Camp New Iraq (Formerly Ashraf) residents have residency or citizenship rights in Europe and North America ...
Anne Singleton from Iran-Interlink visited Camp New Iraq (Formerly Ashraf) in the wake of violent clashes between MEK loyalists and Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi commander in charge of the camp showed some of the pre-manufactured missiles used by the MEK as they attacked Iraqi soldiers at the base.
It is thought that up to 200 MEK members loyal to Massoud Rajavi took part in the violence. It is not known how many of the 3400 residents at the camp continue as members of the terrorist group.
Human Rights organisations have called for an independent investigation into events at the camp.
Singleton visited the camp at the start of a week of meetings with Iraqi officials to demand that the organisational infrastructure of the group be dismantled, and that the leaders are prosecuted under Iraqi and international law. The remaining residents should be enabled to determine their own futures without pressure from the MEK leaders. Their families should be involved to help in this process. Over 1000 Camp New Iraq (Formerly Ashraf) residents have residency or citizenship rights in Europe and North America. The embassies of these countries can facilitate their return.
Detailed reports will follow soon Iran Interlink, Baghdad, April 17 2011
Large metal missiles pre-manufactured by MEK in readiness for violent clashes with Iraqi military
MEK used different coloured headgear to coordinate place and timing of pre-planned actions
Small metal missiles catapulted at soldiers and observers from inside the camp by Rajavi loyalists
MEK expert Anne Singleton outlines plan to close Camp Ashraf
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... Singleton explained that while there is no doubt in anybody’s mind that the MEK must be removed from Iraq by the end of 2011 - as three successive democratically elected governments have demanded since December 2003, as the Iraqi constitution demands and as the status of forces agreement (SOFA) dictates - it is becoming clear that the MEK is a unique phenomenon which cannot be treated as a normal political or military entity and therefore its removal will not be a straightforward mission. Evidence of this has already been seen in the violent resistance to attempts by Iraqi security forces to bring the MEK into line with Iraqi law both in July 2009 and on April 8 this year ...
Anne Singleton visited Iraq as representative of Iran-Interlink at the invitation of the Baladiyeh Foundation, a human rights NGO based in Baghdad. The Baladiyeh Foundation, headed by Mrs Ahlam al-Maliki, provides humanitarian assistance to a wide range of deprived sectors of Iraqi society arising directly from the invasion and occupation of Iraq by allied forces in 2003.
Baladiyeh Foundation is concerned by the humanitarian crisis at Camp Ashraf caused by the group’s leaders who are refusing to allow access to human rights organisations to verify the wellbeing of all of the camp’s residents.
Anne Singleton, a leading expert on the Mojahedin-e Khalq terrorist cult, was invited to speak at al-Mostanserieh University in Baghdad to address the problem of removing the group from Iraq.
Singleton outlined the problem which the Government of Iraq faces, telling the audience that the MEK has been used, particularly by neoconservatives and Zionists in the west, to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq since 2003 when the group mistakenly came under the protection of US forces (the MEK is listed as a terrorist entity in the USA). Since that time, Camp Ashraf has remained the only part of the repressive infrastructure of the former dictator Saddam Hussein which has not been dismantled. In this respect, explained Singleton, the camp has been the locus for training and facilitating violent insurrectionists determined to derail the democratisation process of Iraq. The aim of the violence has been to create sectarian, tribal and religious divisions in Iraqi society which would prevent the unification and progression of the country under a freely elected government. The MEK have acted in conjunction with various Saddamists (Iraqis loyal to the beliefs of the former dictator) and elements in the west in this respect.
Since 2009 when the government of Iraq took over responsibility for protecting the camp from the US military, it has been possible to clamp down on this activity and the result has been a dramatic reduction in the amount of violent activity in the country. However, efforts to remove the group from Iraq as demanded by the Iraqi constitution have been hampered for several reasons.
Singleton explained that while there is no doubt in anybody’s mind that the MEK must be removed from Iraq by the end of 2011 - as three successive democratically elected governments have demanded since December 2003, as the Iraqi constitution demands and as the status of forces agreement (SOFA) dictates - it is becoming clear that the MEK is a unique phenomenon which cannot be treated as a normal political or military entity and therefore its removal will not be a straightforward mission. Evidence of this has already been seen in the violent resistance to attempts by Iraqi security forces to bring the MEK into line with Iraqi law both in July 2009 and on April 8 this year.
Negotiations with the MEK will not resolve the problem explained Singleton, since these talks only address the interests of one person, that is, the MEK leader Massoud Rajavi who is still in hiding in Camp Ashraf. Although he has ordered his loyal followers to violently resist any attempts by the government of Iraq to impose Iraqi law on the camp, it has become clear that only a small number of the camp’s residents are involved in these violent activities. Tens of individuals who have escaped the camp since the 2009 handover all report that most of the camp’s residents are no longer willing or able to continue as members of the terrorist group. It is vital therefore, said Singleton, for an independent agency such as the United Nations Human Rights Commission, to be able to enter the camp without interference, and to conduct a survey of the camp’s residents. This can only be achieved if the MEK leaders are separated from the rank and file and each individual is given the freedom to choose their own future. In this way, the residents of the camp can be removed from Iraqi territory without the violence and bloodshed which is being threatened by Massoud Rajavi.
Iraq is a sovereign country and is capable of resolving this issue in a humanitarian way which will reflect well on this new democracy. The involvement of human rights groups like Baladiyeh Foundation, said Singleton, is a sure sign that the country of Iraq has the confidence and competence to deal with the problem of the MEK effectively and peacefully. The sticking point will be the reaction of western governments which can either help or hinder this process. Above all, it is vital that the UN and other international human rights agencies fully comprehend that the only legitimate human rights position in relation to Camp Ashraf and its residents it to demand the immediate and unconditional organisational disbandment of the group, and to deal with each of the residents as a separate person and not as a slave belonging to Rajavi’s terrorist group.
Almostanserieh paper on Mojahedin Khalq (Anne Singleton)2011
Anne Singleton visits camp New Iraq (formerly Ashraf) of Mojahedin Khalq (MKO, MEK, Rajavi cult) April 2011
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... Anne Singleton of Iran-Interlink, representing the individual members inside Camp Ashraf, visits the camp in a fact-finding mission in the wake of violent conflict between Iraqi military tasked with protecting the camp from external attack and ensuring Iraqi law is obeyed inside the camp, and loyalists of Massoud Rajavi. The residents are hostages to Rajavi's cult activities. Singleton is speaking with former members of the cult who have come to rescue victims who are still trapped inside the MEK headquarters, held incommunicado by Rajavi and his 200 loyalists ...
... Mrs Ahlam Al-Maliki Head of Iraq's Baladiyeh Foundation NGO and Anne Singleton from the UK Iran-Interlink discuss the humanitarian issues involved in removing the Rajavi cult from Iraq. Iran-Interlink represents the views of the disaffected MEK members trapped inside the camp by leader Massoud Rajavi. Singleton explains the only legitimate human rights position is to demand the organisational disbandment of the MEK ...
... One young woman in a white ‘Chanel’ headscarf weeps for her lost father. He has been, she explains, in Camp Ashraf for23 years. He was captured as a POW in Iraq 25 years ago and after two years was among those transferred to the MEK camp where he has been ever since. She hasn’t seen him for 25 years. She wants him to come home with her, and, she says, she will not leave until she can take him out of the camp. Still the families wait and call out to their long-lost relatives in the hope of reaching them. Although the gates of Camp Ashraf are now open, there is still no access to the people held hostage inside. The MEK have simply withdrawn into a smaller circle ...
Since February 2010, the families of Mojahedin-e Khalq members inside Camp Ashraf have been encamped at the front gate of the camp demanding to have news and visits with their long-lost relatives. From elderly parents to the children, grandchildren, sisters and brothers of MEK members, all are seeking information about their relatives. They call out from the front of the camp hoping their voices will be heard by the people inside. They stand on dirt embankments around the perimeter of the camp to call out to their relatives.
The Mojahedin response has been sadly predictable and in line with the cult nature of the group. From the outset they have refused all contact between the members in the camp with the outside world, not only with the families but also human rights agencies and other independent observers.
As the MEK leaders withdrew the rank and file into the centre of the camp so they would not be within sight or sound of the families, the families used loudspeakers to try to project their voices to reach their relatives.
They played music and even the sound of children’s laughter to penetrate the stultifying atmosphere inside Camp Ashraf. In response, the MEK brought its own loudspeakers to prevent the families’ voices reaching the inner parts of the camp. After a while excruciating parasite noise began to be broadcast from American supplied equipment, harmful to all who are exposed to it.
The families have no choice but to sit it out and wait and hope. Where at first the MEK were sent to the gate to shout insults and reject the families, they are no longer brought in view of the outside world. The MEK now are made to shout ‘Death to Khamenei’, ‘Death to the Dictator’ from inside the depths of the camp and their voices projected by loudspeaker to the outside of the camp where the families wait and weep for their lost ones.
One young woman in a white ‘Chanel’ headscarf weeps for her lost father. He has been, she explains, in Camp Ashraf for23 years. He was captured as a POW in Iraq 25 years ago and after two years was among those transferred to the MEK camp where he has been ever since. She hasn’t seen him for 25 years. She wants him to come home with her, and, she says, she will not leave until she can take him out of the camp.
Still the families wait and call out to their long-lost relatives in the hope of reaching them. Although the gates of Camp Ashraf are now open, there is still no access to the people held hostage inside. The MEK have simply withdrawn into a smaller circle, surrounding themselves with barbed wire, embankments and barriers. They have stationed trucks to hide their broadcasting equipment, and covered others with sacking to pretend they do not exist. But worst of all is that now, Massoud Rajavi’s special suppressive forces are patrolling the perimeter of the camp and aggressively engaging with and attacking the families, swearing at them, throwing stones and even catapulting metal missiles at the defenceless families. Several of them have been hit and hurt by these missiles.
The MEK’s backers in Europe and North America continue to raise false alarms and problems concerning the camp and to introduce false information in their various parliaments. In response, government officials have continued to put the record straight. The MEK are not protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The UNHCR has not granted them refugee status in Iraq. The camp continues to be monitored weekly by UNAMI with a separate American presence.
The Iraqi authorities are ensuring that the camp is safe and secure and that the MEK inside receive regular supplies of food, medicine and other essentials, while preventing non-essentials such as barbed wire and weapons being imported into the camp.
But what no one can explain, whether MEK backers or government officials, is why these families are not being helped and why the MEK continue to be allowed to hold 3500 people hostage inside the camp with no recourse to help or rescue. Why are the human rights abuses taking place inside Camp Ashraf not being investigated?
Wondering at those Americans who stand under the flag of Mojahedin Khalq (MKO, MEK, NCRI, Rajavi cult) only to LOBBY for the murderers of their servicemen
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... Massoud Rajavi was on the stage and while he had his hands on his waist he began a war cry against the USA, and in his admiration for Osama Ben Laden and his organization, Al Qaeda, he said, ”This was fanatical Islam which trembled and shacked the basis of US Imperialism and they destroyed the twin towers which were the symbol of their power, and successfully reduced it to rubble through their successful mission”. Then he (Massoud Rajavi) with a smile on his face continued his war cry and said, ”What will happen to the USA if revolutionary Islam with our Ideology and Maryam’s leadership comes to power, then this paper tiger (the USA) will be destroyed as a whole.” ...
This documentary takes us beneath the surface of acts of terror against Iran and shows how Iranians have been targeted by various terrorist groups, some of which enjoying the support of human right organizations.
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